Key Facts
- •The Attorney General (AG) referred two points of law arising from the acquittal of C, a climate change protester, on charges of conspiracy to damage property.
- •C and co-accused, members of the 'Burning Pink' group, damaged various premises (Greenpeace, political party headquarters, etc.) as a climate change protest.
- •C's defence relied on section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, claiming a belief that property owners would have consented to the damage had they known the circumstances.
- •The trial judge allowed the defence to go to the jury, who acquitted C.
Legal Principles
Section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 establishes a subjective test for lawful excuse: a defendant's honest belief that the owner would have consented to the damage if they knew of the damage and its circumstances.
Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 5(2)(a)
The 'circumstances' in section 5(2)(a) are limited to those directly related to the damage itself; they do not include the defendant's political or philosophical beliefs or the merits of the protest.
Court of Appeal interpretation of Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 5(2)(a)
A judge may withdraw a defence from the jury if no reasonable jury, properly directed, could reach a particular conclusion. However, considerable caution must be exercised.
Attorney General’s Reference (No.1 of 2022)
The right to protest does not extend to causing damage to property. The availability of a defence depends on the specific offence and applicable defences.
R v Jones, Ditchfield, Court of Appeal's analysis
Outcomes
The Court of Appeal answered the first question, clarifying the meaning of 'circumstances' in section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
The 'circumstances' must be directly related to the damage, excluding the defendant's broader beliefs or the merits of the protest. The court emphasized the need for a direct nexus between the damage and its circumstances.
The Court of Appeal declined to directly answer the second question about the judge's rulings on withdrawing the defence, citing potential conflict with the acquittal.
Addressing the second question could question the acquittal, contravening section 36(7) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972. However, the court clarified the legal principles governing when a judge may withdraw a defence from the jury.