Key Facts
- •William Sartin's trial for conspiracy to export Class A drugs was interrupted by jury tampering.
- •The jury was discharged, and the judge considered whether to continue the trial without a jury under section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
- •Sartin appealed the judge's decision to continue the trial without a jury, alleging bias.
- •The appeal court considered whether the judge's prior involvement with Sartin's case (including a bail refusal, a fitness-to-plead hearing, and the trial of co-defendants) created actual or apparent bias.
Legal Principles
Section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 allows for the continuation of a trial without a jury after jury tampering.
Criminal Justice Act 2003
Section 47 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 governs appeals against section 46 rulings.
Criminal Justice Act 2003
The normal approach after jury tampering is to continue the trial without a jury, unless unusual circumstances exist.
R v Mohammad (Shahid) [2024] EWCA Crim 34
Apparent bias exists if a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there's a real possibility of bias.
Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67
A judge's prior adverse findings on a discrete issue don't automatically disqualify them from deciding other issues.
Locabail (UK) Limited v Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] QB 451
Outcomes
The appeal was dismissed.
The court found no actual or apparent bias on the part of the judge. The judge's prior involvement with Sartin's case, while extensive, did not create a real possibility of bias in the fair-minded observer's view. The circumstances did not meet the high threshold for 'unusual circumstances' that would prevent a trial without a jury after jury tampering.