Valerie Mingle v The Information Commissioner
[2023] UKFTT 209 (GRC)
Margaret Campbell (deceased) v Information Commissioner
6 March 2024
[2024] UKFTT 188 (GRC)
First-tier Tribunal
An appeal against an Information Commissioner decision was abandoned after the person appealing died. The court decided it couldn't continue because the legal challenge wasn't the kind of thing that can continue after someone dies.
Key Facts
- •Appeal by Margaret Campbell (deceased) against the Information Commissioner.
- •Appeal was under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
- •Appellant died during the proceedings.
- •Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to continue after the appellant's death.
- •No submissions were made on behalf of the deceased appellant.
- •No objection to striking out the appeal was received from the Information Commissioner.
Legal Principles
Causes of action may survive death under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, section 1, but only if a cause of action exists.
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, section 1
A cause of action is 'a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person'.
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at 243 per Diplock LJ
A challenge to a National Security certificate under Data Protection legislation is not a cause of action.
Campbell v Secretary of State [2018] UKUT 372 (AAC)
An appeal under FOIA, similar to the appeal in Campbell v Secretary of State, is a procedural mechanism and not a cause of action.
Tribunal's reasoning based on Campbell v Secretary of State
Sugar (deceased) v BBC & another [2012] UKSC 4 is distinguishable as the appeal continued by consent.
Sugar (deceased) v BBC & another [2012] UKSC 4
Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal after the appellant's death.
Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, rule 8(2)
Outcomes
Appeal struck out.
The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to continue hearing the appeal after the death of the appellant. The appeal was deemed to be a procedural mechanism rather than a cause of action that survives death.