David George Davies v The Commissioners for HMRC
[2024] UKFTT 704 (TC)
Engim Cenkci v The Commissioners for HMRC
9 March 2023
[2023] UKFTT 270 (TC)
First-tier Tribunal
Someone was late appealing tax assessments. They claimed to have sent an appeal letter on time, but couldn't prove it. The judge said the delay was too long and their reasons weren't good enough, so they couldn't appeal late.
Key Facts
- •HMRC issued discovery assessments and penalty assessments for capital gains tax for several tax years (2007-08, 2010-11, 2012-13, 2014-15, and 2015-16) to Mr Cenkci.
- •Mr Cenkci's agent, Ms Nihat, claimed to have sent an appeal letter on 27 July 2020, but HMRC did not receive it until April 2021.
- •HMRC denied receiving the appeal letter in July 2020.
- •Ms Nihat argued that the delay was due to her belief that the appeal was ongoing based on conversations with HMRC.
- •HMRC argued that the taxpayer failed to engage with their information requests and that there was no credible evidence supporting their claim that the appeal was sent in July 2020.
Legal Principles
The burden of proof is on the appellant to show that an appeal was made within the time limit.
HMRC's arguments
Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978: If a document is sent by post, it's deemed served when it would normally be delivered, unless proven otherwise.
Interpretation Act 1978
Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 sets out a three-stage process for considering late appeal applications: (1) Length of delay, (2) Reason for delay, (3) Balancing exercise considering prejudice to both parties and the need for efficient litigation.
Martland v HMRC
Outcomes
The Tribunal found that the appeal was not made on or around 27 July 2020.
The appellant failed to meet the burden of proof to demonstrate the appeal letter was sent on that date. There was no corroborating evidence beyond a copy kept on file, and HMRC denied receiving it until much later.
The Tribunal refused permission for a late appeal.
Applying the Martland test, the Tribunal found the delay was serious and significant, the reason for the delay was not sufficient, and the need for efficient litigation outweighed the prejudice to the appellant. The appellant's case was deemed to have very low prospects of success.