Joseph W Horsford (as Administrator of the Estate of William Horsford, deceased) v Geoffrey Croft (Antigua and Barbuda)
[2024] UKPC 4
Christopher Price v Jonathan Nunn
19 December 2023
[2023] EWHC 3200 (Ch)
High Court
Two neighbors fought for years over a road and land. The judge decided the road wasn't officially a road for cars, and one neighbor only owns half of the disputed land.
Key Facts
- •Neighbor dispute over a right of way lasting almost 50 years.
- •Claimant (Mr. Price) owns Painswick Slad Farm, Defendant (Mr. Nunn) owns Woodside Bungalow.
- •Dispute involves three tracks: the Pitch, the Lower Track, and the Upper Track.
- •Previous litigation involving Mr. Nunn's predecessors in title (the Closes) and Mr. Price's family.
- •Mr. Nunn claims a private vehicular right of way under section 67(5) of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 (NERCA).
- •Mr. Price claims ownership of the Upper Track (entirely or half).
Legal Principles
Once a highway, always a highway, unless lawfully stopped up or physically destroyed.
Common law
Interpretation of "common highway" in the Turnpike Act of 1800.
Turnpike Act 1800, Section XVII
Ad medium filum viae presumption: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land abutting a road owns the soil underneath up to its center line.
Common law
Section 67 of NERCA: Extinguishment of public rights of way for mechanically propelled vehicles (MPVs), with exceptions; creation of private rights of way under certain circumstances.
NERCA, Section 67
Res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process.
Common law
Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows: Implication of easements.
Wheeldon v Burrows (1879)
Outcomes
Mr. Nunn is not estopped from claiming a private right of way under NERCA.
Special circumstances of the case, including the development of the claim and the creation of a new access route, outweigh the principles of issue estoppel.
Mr. Nunn has not established that Route 3 (as identified in the Turnpike Act) followed the path of the Upper Track and the Pitch or Lower Track.
Insufficient evidence to prove the connection to the turnpike road via the Pitch or Lower Track; physical characteristics of the Pitch.
Mr. Nunn's claim for a private vehicular right of way under NERCA over the Upper Track is rejected.
The Upper Track cannot be considered in isolation from other parts of Route 3; insufficient evidence to establish public vehicular highway status.
The exercise of a vehicular right of way over the Upper Track before May 2006 was reasonably necessary for access to Woodside Bungalow (hypothetical).
Access by MPV was conducive to the reasonable enjoyment of Woodside Bungalow.
Mr. Price is not estopped from claiming ownership of the Upper Track.
Judge Cridlan's remarks on ownership were obiter dicta; Mr. Price's father's concession did not preclude the claim.
Mr. Price has not established ownership of the entire Upper Track.
Conveyancing documents do not show inclusion of the Upper Track in the land conveyed to Mr. Price's predecessors.
Mr. Price owns half of the Upper Track up to its middle line.
Application of the ad medium filum principle; Mr. Moore's argument regarding the Turnpike Act trustees is rejected.