Key Facts
- •Ross Grier appealed a conviction for driving without due care and attention and failing to stop for police.
- •The appeal concerned the admissibility of identification evidence from PC Price, who identified Grier at a police station without a formal identification procedure.
- •PC Price observed Grier driving a Nissan Qashqai, pursued him, and later identified him at the police station.
- •Grier's defense argued that the lack of an identification procedure under PACE Code D breached Code D and rendered the identification evidence inadmissible under s. 78 PACE.
- •The District Judge found Grier guilty, and the High Court considered the appeal by way of a case stated.
Legal Principles
Section 78 PACE allows courts to exclude evidence if its admission would adversely affect the fairness of proceedings.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)
Under s. 78 PACE, if admitting evidence would render a trial unfair, it cannot be admitted. It is not a matter of discretion.
R v Twigg [2019] 1 WLR 6533
Appellate courts will not lightly interfere with a trial judge's decision on admissibility under s. 78, only if no reasonable judge could have reached that conclusion.
R v Bogie [2023] EWCA Crim 1280
PACE Code D mandates an identification procedure if a suspect disputes identification, and whether a dispute exists is a fact-sensitive inquiry.
R v Nunes [2001] EWCA Crim 2283, R v Gojra [2010] EWCA Crim 1939, Code D (2017 version)
Code D is a practical document; its provisions should be interpreted as they are written.
R v Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473
Outcomes
The appeal was dismissed.
The court found no breach of Code D. Grier did not dispute his identity until after the police station encounter, and a post-trial identification procedure would have served no purpose. Even if there were a breach, the court held that the admission of the identification evidence did not create sufficient prejudice to warrant exclusion under s. 78 PACE. Corroborating evidence existed (insurance and attempt to retrieve vehicle).