Key Facts
- •The Secretary of State applied for a pre-action anonymity order against the respondent (KIB) in TPIM proceedings, without notice.
- •The order sought to prevent publication of KIB's involvement in the proceedings and their address.
- •The application raised issues of open justice, freedom of expression, and the respondent's Convention rights.
- •Previous TPIM cases had granted similar orders without respondent notice.
- •The order's potential consequences included restricting KIB's speech, impacting press freedom, and enabling enforcement via contempt proceedings.
Legal Principles
Open justice principle; proceedings generally take place in public.
Scott v Scott [1913] AC 463, Re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47
Power to grant anonymity orders exists, but requires strong justification and is a derogation from open justice.
Master of the Rolls’ Practice Guidance: Interim Non-Disclosure Orders [2012] 1 WLR 1003
Anonymity orders can be based on Human Rights Act 1998, balancing Article 8 (right to private life) and Article 10 (freedom of expression).
Human Rights Act 1998, section 6(1); Senior Courts Act 1981, section 37(1); Re S
Anonymity orders and reporting restrictions often go hand-in-hand, along with restrictions on court file access.
Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 11; CPR 5.4C
TPIM proceedings modify the overriding objective to prevent disclosure against the public interest.
CPR 80.2(2)
Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires particular regard to freedom of expression when considering relief that might affect its exercise.
Human Rights Act 1998, section 12
Outcomes
Application for anonymity order refused.
The order was sought primarily to ease the Secretary of State's task, not to protect the respondent. The order was disproportionate to the respondent's freedom of expression and went beyond the scope of an anonymity order under Schedule 4 of the 2011 Act and CPR 80.15. Alternative, less restrictive measures were available.