Michael James Daw & Ors, R (on the application of) v Staffordshire County Council
[2024] EWHC 963 (Admin)
Pamela Wesson v Cambridgeshire County Council
7 May 2024
[2024] EWHC 1068 (Admin)
High Court
A group challenged a decision to close a bridge to most cars in Cambridge. The court found some mistakes in how the decision was made but said the challengers didn't show they were significantly harmed by those mistakes, so they lost on one point. However, they had a good chance of winning on other points, so the court let those parts of the challenge continue.
Key Facts
- •Pamela Wesson, Chair of Friends of Mill Road Bridge, challenged Cambridgeshire County Council's decision to make the Cambridge (Mill Road) (Bus Gate) Order 2023.
- •The Order restricts vehicular use of Mill Road, including Mill Road Bridge, except for buses, taxis, bicycles, and authorized vehicles.
- •Wesson's claim was based on seven grounds, challenging the validity of the Order under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.
- •The Council applied for summary judgment or strike-out of all or parts of the claim.
- •The court considered the procedural history, including previous applications for interim relief and amendment of the claim.
- •The court analyzed the legal framework, including the 1984 Act, the 1996 Regulations, and the Equality Act 2010.
- •The court also reviewed the civil procedure rules on striking out and summary judgment.
Legal Principles
A claimant bringing a statutory claim under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act is not required to obtain the permission of the Court.
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984
On a statutory claim of this kind, the Court’s function is limited to considering whether the Order or any of its provisions are within the relevant powers of the Defendant under the statutory scheme and the relevant requirements imposed on the Defendant for the making of such an order have been complied with.
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, paragraph 35 of Schedule 9
The power to quash an order under paragraph 36(1)(b) of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act requires the applicant to have been substantially prejudiced by any failure to comply with the relevant requirements.
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, paragraph 36(1)(b) of Schedule 9
The public sector equality duty requires a proper and conscientious focus on the statutory criteria; the decision-maker must be properly informed; the duty is on the decision-maker personally.
Equality Act 2010, section 149
The court may give summary judgment against a claimant if it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim and there is no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at trial.
CPR 24.3
Statements of case which are suitable for striking out include those which raise an unwinnable case.
CPR 3.4(2)(a)
Outcomes
Summary judgment for the Defendant on Ground 1 (failure to provide adequate reasons for proposing the Order).
While the statement of reasons was deficient, the Claimant failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice.
Defendant's application for summary judgment or strike-out refused on Grounds 2, 3, 4(a), 5, and 7.
The Claimant had a realistic prospect of success on these grounds, particularly regarding the adequacy of reasons provided to objectors, a potential mistake of fact concerning carer exemptions, the public sector equality duty, irrelevant considerations (funding), and predetermination/apparent bias.
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