Key Facts
- •Jonathan Harris Sinclair (Claimant), liquidator of Judmick Estates Limited, sought a declaration that the First and Second Defendants had no right to an escrow account holding £276,377.93.
- •The escrow account originated from the sale of Judmick's contaminated land, with funds initially held pending the outcome of criminal proceedings against the First Defendant (Rodney Whiston-Dew), a former solicitor convicted of fraud.
- •The First Defendant was released from prison but had a confiscation order against him.
- •The Second Defendant (Churwitz Stanford AG Holdings Ltd) is a company allegedly involved in fraudulent attempts to claim the escrow funds.
- •The First Defendant initiated legal proceedings (Norwich County Court and Queen's Bench Division) to obtain the escrow funds, which were deemed fraudulent by the court.
- •The Claimant provided evidence suggesting the Second Defendant's involvement in defamatory online publications alleging fraud by the Claimant and his solicitor.
Legal Principles
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 346(1): A creditor cannot retain the benefit of execution if issued before the commencement of bankruptcy unless completed before the bankruptcy.
Insolvency Act 1986
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 278: Bankruptcy commences on the date of the bankruptcy order.
Insolvency Act 1986
Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process and fraud on the court.
Common Law
Outcomes
The court granted the Claimant's Part 8 claim for a declaration.
The court found that neither the First nor Second Defendant had any right, title, or interest in the escrow account. Their attempts to claim the funds through various legal proceedings were deemed fraudulent.
The court dismissed the First Defendant's application to set aside a previous order.
The application lacked proper evidence and was deemed an abuse of process and a fraud on the court.
The court discharged the charging order obtained by the Defendants in the Norwich County Court proceedings.
The charging order was deemed invalid as it was made after the commencement of the First Defendant's bankruptcy.