Surena Masih & Anor. v The Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust
[2023] EWHC 1280 (KB)
Wendy Price v Marston's PLC
7 June 2024
[2024] EWHC 1352 (KB)
High Court
A chef died after a workplace fall. The court decided the fall caused his death, but corrected the judge's calculations of how long he would have lived and how much his wife should receive in compensation. The wife will get more money than the judge originally decided.
Key Facts
- •David Price, a chef employed by Marston's PLC, tripped and fell at work, sustaining injuries that led to a fatal infection.
- •Liability was admitted by Marston's PLC.
- •The case concerned causation of death, Mr. Price's life expectancy, and financial dependency.
- •Appeals were lodged by both the claimant (Mrs. Price) and the defendant (Marston's PLC).
Legal Principles
A claimant can recover damages for personal injuries caused or materially contributed to by the defendant's negligence.
Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] 2 WLR 707
In multiple potential source infection cases, the claimant must prove, to an extent greater than 50%, that the source relied upon is the cause.
This case
An appellate court will interfere with a trial judge's findings of fact only if the decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified.
Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600
The modern practice in calculating net dependency under the Fatal Accidents Acts is to deduct a percentage from the net income figure to represent what the deceased would have spent exclusively on himself. For a husband and wife, this is conventionally 33%.
Harris v Empress Motors Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 212
The dependency is fixed at the moment of death; it is what the dependants would probably have received as benefit from the deceased, had the deceased not died.
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust v Williams [2008] EWCA Civ 81
Outcomes
Marston's appeal on causation of death was dismissed.
The judge's preference for the claimant's expert evidence on the link between the fall and the fatal infection was deemed reasonable and adequately explained.
Mrs. Price's appeal on life expectancy was allowed.
The judge's decision to reduce life expectancy by 9 years due to obesity, despite preferring an expert's evidence suggesting 8 years, was deemed contradictory and unjustified.
Mrs. Price's appeal on financial dependency was allowed, except for the period after Mr. Price's hypothetical retirement at age 73.
The judge's unconventional approach to calculating financial dependency, departing from established case law, was deemed flawed due to insufficient evidence and lack of justification. The court reverted to the conventional approach based on figures at the time of death.