Key Facts
- •Poultry farmers (Claimants) sued the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defendant) over compensation for birds culled due to Avian Influenza (AI).
- •The Defendant's initial policy compensated only for birds healthy at the time of culling, not condemnation.
- •The highly virulent AI strain caused many birds condemned but not yet culled to die before slaughter, reducing compensation.
- •The Defendant introduced a new policy in October 2022 to compensate birds healthy at condemnation.
- •The Claimants challenged the original and new policies via judicial review, arguing breach of the Animal Health Act 1981 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Legal Principles
Statutory interpretation aims to ascertain Parliament's intention from the chosen words, considering the act as a whole and its context.
R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 at [38]
Parliamentary intention is an objective concept, derived from the reasonably imputed intention from the language used.
R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349
Statutes should not be interpreted to interfere with or injure person's rights without compensation unless clearly ordered by Parliament.
Attorney-General v Horner (1884) 14 QBD 245
Statutes should not take away private property rights without compensation unless the intention is clear and unambiguous.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners [1927] AC 343
Primary legislation must be read compatibly with Convention rights where possible (Human Rights Act 1998, s.3).
Human Rights Act 1998, s.3
In A1P1 cases, interference with property rights must be lawful, pursue a legitimate aim, and be proportionate.
Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights
Outcomes
Grounds 1 and 3 succeeded. The old and new compensation policies were declared unlawful.
The court interpreted the Animal Health Act 1981 to require compensation at the point of condemnation, not slaughter. The new policy failed to reflect this, and contained inaccurate statements of the law.
Ground 2 (A1P1 claim) failed.
Condemnation was deemed a 'control of use' of property, not a 'deprivation'. The court found that the compensation scheme, while imperfect, wasn't disproportionate within the state's margin of appreciation.
Grounds 1 and 2 were deemed brought in time.
They concerned an ongoing breach of statutory duty to pay compensation.