Court Clarifies Standards for Defamation and Harassment in Daniel Miller & Anor v Luke Turner: Upholding Freedom of Expression

Introduction

In the High Court ruling of Daniel Miller & Anor v Luke Turner, The Honourable Mrs Justice Collins Rice deliberated on key principles pertaining to freedom of expression, its limits within the legal framework, and the threshold for actionable defamation and harassment under UK law. This complex case involved parties active in the art and intellectual world, engaging in a contentious debate traversed in both real life and the social media platform Twitter.

Key Facts

The case centered around three individuals, each with a significant presence in the realm of art and ideas, who found themselves embroiled in a dispute characterized by polarizing opinions and a series of Twitter interactions. Claimants Miller and Power sought redress for alleged libel, while defendant Turner countered with claims of harassment. The contentious issues revolved around 16 tweets and a webpage published by Turner that the Claimants argued were defamatory, paired with their broader course of online conduct claimed to be harassing by Turner.

Legal Principles

Defamation

The court applied the Defamation Act 2013, particularly the ‘serious harm’ test detailed in section 1, which mandates that a statement cannot be deemed defamatory unless it has caused or is likely to cause considerable harm to the claimant’s reputation. Following the Lachaux precedent, the court emphasized that serious harm must be evidenced, taking into account the tweet’s inherent seriousness, the extent of publication and followership, and the persistence of the publication.

Moreover, the court reiterated that defamation is concerned not with a claimant’s subjective view but with the publication’s actual effect on the claimant’s reputation among third parties. The burden of establishing this link falls on the claimant. The principle of freedom of expression underpins defamation law, necessitating a balance between protection from reputational harm and the right to free speech.

Harassment

The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 outlines that harassment amounts to a course of conduct that a reasonable person would consider to be oppressive, and under section 1(3)(c) it cannot be deemed harassment if the conduct is seen as reasonable. Case law also calls for the course of conduct to reach a level of gravity indicative of criminal liability, aligning with Majrowski v Guy’s & St Thomas’s NHS Trust.

The law also recognizes the importance of freedom of expression, especially in cases involving speech. Thus, harassing conduct must be distinguished from merely offensive or distressing speech, which may be safeguarded under Article 10 of the ECHR.

Outcomes

The court found that the claimants had not satisfied the serious harm requirement for defamation pursuant to section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013. In the absence of evidence directly linking the tweets to substantial harm to the claimants’ reputation, the court could not infer serious harm.

Similarly, for the counterclaim of harassment, the court determined that while the claimants’ online conduct might be characterized as regrettable and even aggressive, it did not ascend to the threshold of quasi-criminal gravity required by law to constitute harassment.

Conclusion

The Daniel Miller & Anor v Luke Turner decision underscores the stringent standards UK courts uphold in defamation and harassment claims, especially when they intersect with the fundamental right to freedom of expression. The rulings reflect a meticulous approach to ensuring that the speech involved is not only subjectively distressing or objectionable but objectively injurious to reputation or harassing to a quasi-criminal degree. The court’s decisions affirm the law’s inclination to default to protecting freedom of expression in the realm of public debate and private disagreement, only intervening when clear evidence supports crossing the threshold into actionable harm.