Key Facts
- •Mr. Ingle requested information from Cambridgeshire County Council (the Council) regarding a complaint stemming from a 1970 planning appeal.
- •The Council initially refused the request based on legal professional privilege (LPP), later shifting to the FOIA section 40(1) exemption (personal data).
- •The Information Commissioner upheld the Council's refusal under section 40(1), finding the information to be Mr. Ingle's personal data.
- •Mr. Ingle appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) and then to the Upper Tribunal.
- •The appeal centered on whether the documents constituted Mr. Ingle's personal data, estoppel, and allegations of procedural unfairness.
Legal Principles
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) section 40(1): Information is exempt if it constitutes personal data of which the applicant is the data subject.
FOIA
Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) section 3(2): Personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual.
DPA 2018
A public authority is not estopped from relying on a FOIA exemption simply because it failed to rely on it at an earlier stage.
Information Commissioner v Home Office [2011] UKUT 17 (AAC); Birkett v Information Commissioner and DEFRA [2011] EWCA Civ 1606; FCDO v Information Commissioner, Williams and Others [2021] UKUT 248 (AAC)
Outcomes
The Upper Tribunal dismissed Mr. Ingle's appeal.
The FTT's decision involved no error of law. The documents constituted Mr. Ingle's personal data under FOIA section 40(1), and the doctrine of estoppel did not apply. Allegations of trickery and subterfuge were unfounded.