Arvindar Singh (as trustee in bankruptcy of Mrs Angela Garcha) v Angela Garcha & Ors
[2024] EWHC 1844 (Ch)
Ann Nilsson & Anor v Collette Cynberg
23 August 2024
[2024] EWHC 2164 (Ch)
High Court
A husband and wife owned a house together. They separated, and the husband said his wife could keep the house. He then went bankrupt, and the bankruptcy people tried to claim half the house. The judge said the wife got the whole house because the husband gave it to her. The appeal court agreed with the judge.
Key Facts
- •Husband and wife (Mr. and Mrs. Cynberg) purchased a property in joint names.
- •They separated, and the husband (Mr. Cynberg) allegedly agreed the wife (Mrs. Cynberg) could have the property.
- •Husband later went bankrupt.
- •Trustees in bankruptcy (Appellants) claimed an interest in the property.
- •Wife argued a common intention constructive trust or proprietary estoppel gave her sole ownership.
- •District Judge ruled in favor of the wife.
- •Trustees appealed on four grounds.
Legal Principles
An express declaration of trust is conclusive unless varied by subsequent agreement or affected by proprietary estoppel.
Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17
A subsequent agreement that varies an express declaration of trust can be informal, including a common intention constructive trust.
Clarke v Meadus [2010] EWHC 3117 (Ch)
For proprietary estoppel, detriment must be sufficient to create unconscionability, considering countervailing benefits and causal link between assurances and reliance.
Various cases discussed, including Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27
In proprietary estoppel, the timing of the estoppel's creation is crucial, particularly concerning the five-year lookback period of section 341(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
Insolvency Act 1986, section 341(1)(a)
Outcomes
Appeal dismissed on Ground 1 (express declaration of trust overridden by subsequent common intention constructive trust).
A common intention constructive trust can act as a 'subsequent agreement' to override an express declaration of trust; this interpretation avoids an arbitrary distinction between constructive trusts and proprietary estoppels.
Appeal dismissed on Ground 2 (sufficient detriment for proprietary estoppel).
Detriment included not just home improvements but also foregoing ancillary relief and paying the mortgage; countervailing benefits were outweighed by the detriment.
Appeal dismissed on Ground 3 (sufficient assurances for proprietary estoppel).
The Judge's finding that a clear agreement existed in 2009 was supported by the evidence, despite subsequent solicitor correspondence suggesting otherwise.
Appeal dismissed on Ground 4 (proprietary estoppel arose in 2009).
Detriment (mortgage payments) predated the home improvements and occurred outside the five-year lookback period, thus the counterclaim under section 339 of the IA 1986 failed.