Key Facts
- •Appeal against a refusal to strike out an application to set aside a consent order in financial remedy proceedings.
- •The consent order was made on 22 August 2023.
- •The husband's application to set aside the order was based on the wife's alleged non-disclosure of funds received from her family.
- •The wife argued that the Court of Appeal decision in Roocroft v Ball, which held that the principles in Wyatt v Vince applied to set-aside applications, was either superseded by FPR 2010, Rule 9.9A, or wrongly decided.
- •The lower court judge refused to strike out the application, granting permission to appeal.
- •The appeal was heard in the Family Division of the High Court.
- •The parties' financial circumstances were relatively modest.
- •The wife received substantial sums from her family after the consent order was made.
Legal Principles
The power to strike out an application under FPR 4.4(1) is limited to legally unrecognisable claims in the context of final financial remedy orders (Wyatt v Vince).
Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14
The principles in Wyatt v Vince apply equally to applications to set aside consent orders in financial remedy proceedings.
Roocroft v Ball [2017] 2 FLR 810
FPR 2010, Rule 9.9A, and PD 9A provide a streamlined procedure for setting aside financial remedy orders where no error of the court is alleged, granting the court broader case management powers, including the power to strike out or summarily dispose of such applications.
FPR 2010, Rule 9.9A and PD 9A
A court is bound by the decisions of higher courts. A High Court judge is bound by Court of Appeal decisions, even if they disagree with the interpretation of Supreme Court decisions.
Doctrine of Precedent
Outcomes
The appeal was allowed.
The judge found that the lower court erred in law by applying Roocroft v Ball without considering the impact of the subsequently introduced FPR 2010, Rule 9.9A, and PD 9A, which provide a different framework for dealing with applications to set aside financial remedy orders.
The case was remitted to the lower court for rehearing.
The High Court judge held that the lower court now has the power to summarily dispose of the application based on its merits, but the application itself was not deemed frivolous or without merit.