Appellate Court Examines Principles of Sentencing in Firearms Offence Case

Citation: [2023] EWCA Crim 1494
Judgment on


In the appellate case of R v Paul Anthony Glynn before the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), a significant and complex examination of the principles surrounding the sentencing of firearms offences is demonstrated. Lord Justice Singh and Mrs Justice McGowan presided over this appeal, reflecting on the appropriate use of concurrent and consecutive sentencing, the impact of guilty pleas on statutory minimum sentences, and the interpretation of separate criminal transactions. This analysis seeks to elucidate the legal principles applied in this judgement, with direct references to the relevant parts of the case summary, beneficial for legal professionals practicing in the UK.

Key Facts

Paul Anthony Glynn, aged 53 years, was sentenced to a cumulative 19 years’ imprisonment for a series of serious firearms offences. This sentence was composed of three consecutive terms for possessing prohibited firearms, besides additional concurrent terms for related ammunition possession charges. A search of Glynn’s home had revealed firearms and ammunition scattered throughout, with evidence of at least one firearm being loaded and discharged within the premises.

Glynn had a criminal history of firearms possession and had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, albeit with a rejected basis of plea. Considering his history and the fact that firearms were accessible to children, high culpability (Category A) and Category 1 harm were assigned.

The appeal focussed on two critical issues: the propriety of imposing consecutive sentences for firearms offences found at the same place and time, and the judge’s understanding of the permissible credit for a guilty plea in light of a statutory minimum sentence.

1. Sentencing Principles: Consecutive vs Concurrent Sentencing

A pivotal point was the applicability of consecutive sentences. The Appeal Court relied on the principle that consecutive sentences are generally not imposed for offences stemming from the same incident or transaction, as seen in Attorney General’s Reference No 57 of 2009 (R v Ralphs) [2009] EWCA Crim 2555 and reinforced in R v Asif [2018] EWCA Crim 2297.

2. Credit for Guilty Pleas and Statutory Minimum Sentences

Another significant principle involved the permissible reduction in sentence for an early guilty plea, as set out in the Sentencing Act 2020. The guideline dictates a one-third reduction, but where a statutory minimum applies, the sentence cannot fall below 80% of the minimum after such a reduction, a point misunderstood by the sentencing judge.


The court found that the sentencing judge erred in how concurrent and consecutive sentences were employed, as well as in the understanding of credit for Glynn’s guilty plea. The Appeal Court ruled that while Glynn did not bring in all items on a single occasion, the evidence did not support three separate deposits. Consequently, it was decided that two consecutive sentences for counts 1 and 3, totalling 18 years, was appropriate. With a one-third credit for his guilty plea, this total was reduced to 12 years. The court confirmed this revised sentencing structure while keeping the remainder of the sentences for other counts unchanged.


This appellate judgement critically assesses the limits and applications of consecutive sentencing in cases with multiple similar offences, while also clarifying the implications of guilty pleas in the context of statutory minimum sentences. It highlights the judiciary’s caution against sentencing that erroneously escalates beyond the statutory maximum penalty and affirms the principles guiding sentence reductions for early guilty pleas. The ruling in R v Glynn serves as a nuanced illustration of how concurrent and consecutive sentences should be balanced to reflect an offender’s overall criminality without violating established legal maxims. Legal professionals can draw upon this case as precedent for correctly applying sentencing guidelines while ensuring that reductions for guilty pleas are consistently and fairly allocated.

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