Tribunal Strikes Out Appeal In Data Protection Case Due To Commissioner's Actions

Introduction

The case of David Miles v The Information Commissioner involves an appeal under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) to the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) concerning the handling of a subject access request (SAR) by Brentwood Ursuline Convent High School (BUCHS) and the subsequent complaint made to the Information Commissioner (the Commissioner). The key topics discussed in this case include the application of rule 8 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 and the principles governing strike-out applications, as well as the statutory framework under sections 165 and 166 of the DPA.

Key Facts

Mr. Miles, dissatisfied with the response to his SAR from BUCHS, complained to the Commissioner. After experiencing delays in the complaint being addressed, Mr. Miles appealed to the Tribunal seeking a directive for a response from the Commissioner. The Commissioner proceeded with the complaint by contacting BUCHS and providing Mr. Miles with updates. In response to Mr. Miles’s Application, the Commissioner sought an Order to strike it out, arguing that there was no reasonable prospect of Mr. Miles’s case succeeding given that the Commissioner had now taken appropriate steps in relation to the complaint.

Legal Principles

The Tribunal applied rule 8(3)(c) of the 2009 Rules which permits the striking out of proceedings where “there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.” The Upper Tribunal’s rulings in HMRC v Fairford Group and AW v Information Commissioner and Blackpool CC informed this application process, emphasizing a non-fanciful prospect of success standard and considering the overarching interests of justice as stipulated by rule 2 of the GRC Rules.

The case further hinged on sections 166 and 165 of the DPA, which outline the Tribunal’s powers and the Commissioner’s obligations in relation to complaints made by data subjects. The principles articulated in Killock & Veale & others v Information Commissioner were invoked, clarifying the nature of the Commissioner’s response and the Tribunal’s role in assessing whether the Commissioner has taken “appropriate steps” in the context of a complaint under the DPA.

Outcomes

The Tribunal concluded that the Commissioner had taken the necessary and appropriate steps by writing to BUCHS, ensuring compliance with data protection obligations, and providing the applicant with progress and outcome updates regarding the SAR and complaint. Since the Commissioner had addressed the complaint by the time the Application was filed before the Tribunal, and given the Commissioner’s expert discretion, the Tribunal found there was no reasonable prospect of Mr. Miles’s case succeeding. Consequently, the Tribunal struck out the application.

Conclusion

In David Miles v The Information Commissioner, the application was struck out because the Commissioner, albeit after a delay, took appropriate steps to progress the original complaint as required by the DPA. The Tribunal’s decision underscores the importance of the effective administration of justice in the context of handling data protection complaints, upholding the principle that once the Commissioner takes appropriate action, further proceedings in the Tribunal may not be necessary or proportionate.