Tribunal rules request not vexatious in FOIA appeal

Citation: [2023] UKFTT 956 (GRC)
Judgment on

Introduction

In the case of G Brida v The Information Commissioner ([2023] UKFTT 956 (GRC)), the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) dealt with an appeal against a decision by The Information Commissioner to classify a Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) request as vexatious. The case sheds light on the application of section 14(1) of the FOIA, the interpretation of the term ‘vexatious’, and its practical implications for public authorities responding to information requests. The Tribunal’s decision hinges on the legal principles established in precedent cases, particularly Dransfield v The Information Commissioner and Department for Energy and Climate Change ([2012] UKUT 440 (AAC)) and Dransfield v The Information Commissioner and Another ([2015] EWCA Civ 454), providing a nuanced view of ‘vexatiousness’ in the context of FOIA requests.

Key Facts

Appellant G Brida appealed against the Commissioner’s decision to uphold The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) refusal to comply with his FOIA request on the basis of vexatiousness under section 14 FOIA. The series of requests made by the appellant sought information regarding the ICO’s handling of his complaints related to data protection issues with ARC Legal Services and Trowers & Hamlins LLP.

The decision to class the request as vexatious was grounded in the ICO’s interpretation that the appellant’s purpose was to cause disruption rather than seek valuable information. The appellant contested this, arguing that the email of 18 January 2023 did not constitute a new FOI request, and, if regarded as one, it should not have been deemed vexatious.

The Tribunal evaluated the request’s alleged vexatiousness under the FOIA, applying principles from Dransfield case law. The key elements of analysis were the burden on the public authority, the motive of the requester, the value or serious purpose of the request, and any actual or likely harassment or distress to staff. These factors are non-exhaustive and do not form a checklist but guide a holistic determination of vexatiousness:

  1. Burden of Compliance: The Tribunal considered the request in the context of past dealings with the public authority, including the number, breadth, and pattern of previous requests. The Tribunal concluded that the request, while causing some disruption and irritation, did not impose a heavy burden on the public authority.

  2. Motive of Requester: Vexatiousness concerns the nature of the request, not the requester. The Tribunal found the appellant’s motive was to support his claim that the ICO handled his complaints improperly—this motive was not deemed inappropriate within the FOIA framework.

  3. Value or Serious Purpose of the Request: The request aimed to acquire information potentially beneficial for forthcoming legal proceedings. Although there was personal value to the appellant, the purpose was not unjustifiable. The Tribunal recognized a public interest in the transparency of the ICO’s complaint-handling procedures.

  4. Harassment and Distress to Staff: The Tribunal determined that while some comments could be seen as impolite, there was no reasonable foundation to deem them as harassment or distress.

The Tribunal’s role was a full-merits review, adhering to s.58 FOIA, which required an impartial re-examination of facts and discretion within the scope of the law.

Outcomes

The Tribunal allowed the appeal, finding that the request was not vexatious according to section 14 FOIA’s high standard. It mandated a fresh response from the public authority, uncoupled from section 14(1), to be issued within 35 days following the decision. This reversed the Commissioner’s position and placed expectations on the ICO to reassess and adequately address the request within the legal framework.

Conclusion

The case of G Brida v The Information Commissioner clarifies the interpretation and application of the vexatiousness exemption under FOIA, reinforcing that such a label requires a substantive and contextually sensitive justification. The Tribunal’s decision, grounded in legality rather than subjective notions of irritation or inconvenience, underlines the right to information as a fundamental constitutional principle that demands a high threshold to be curtailed. This serves as a guiding precedent for UK legal professionals on the careful evaluation needed when determining the vexatious nature of FOIA requests and demonstrates that vexatiousness is not to be concluded lightly.