Tribunal's Jurisdictional Limits in Complaints Against Information Commissioner

Introduction

The case of Sandra Dennerlein v The Information Commissioner provides a critical examination of the jurisdictional limitations of the Tribunal in handling complaints against the Information Commissioner. This analysis will elucidate on the legal principles applied in this case, linking them directly to the relevant parts of the case law summary.

Jurisdictional Limitations of the Tribunal

The central issue in this case revolves around the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to complaints made against the Information Commissioner’s handling of personal information disputes. The Tribunal’s powers are circumscribed to ordering the Commissioner to take appropriate steps to respond to complaints or to keep the complainant informed about the progress and outcome of their complaint. It does not extend to altering the outcome of the complaint or mandating specific actions from the Commissioner.

In the appeal by Ms. Dennerlein against the Information Commissioner’s decision not to pursue her complaint against Barclays Bank for mishandling her personal information, the Tribunal was confronted with the question of its own jurisdiction. The Information Commissioner sought to strike out the appeal on the grounds that the Tribunal lacked the authority to adjudicate on the matter, as the desired outcome fell outside its statutory remit.

Interpretation of “Appropriate Steps”

The Tribunal’s approach is informed by the precedent set in Leighton v Information Commissioner (No.2), where it was clarified that “appropriate steps” refer to the process of responding to a complaint rather than resolving it to the complainant’s satisfaction. The Tribunal’s role is not to dictate the investigative methods of the Information Commissioner, which would impinge upon the Commissioner’s regulatory discretion.

The Tribunal’s Role in Addressing Procedural Issues

This interpretation was later upheld by the High Court in R (on the application of Delo) v Information Commissioner and Wise Payments Ltd, reinforcing the principle that the Tribunal’s function is to address procedural defects rather than to evaluate the substance of the Commissioner’s response.

The Tribunal’s Inability to Alter the Outcome of Complaints

In light of these principles, the Tribunal in the current case determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Ms. Dennerlein’s appeal. The Tribunal concluded that the appeal was outside the scope of s166 of the Data Protection Act (DPA), and the relief sought by the complainant was beyond the Tribunal’s powers.

Alternative Remedy for Complainants

Consequently, the Tribunal struck out the appeal, indicating that the appropriate course of action for the complainant, should they believe their information rights have been violated, is to pursue an order of compliance through separate civil proceedings.

In conclusion, the case of Sandra Dennerlein v The Information Commissioner underscores the jurisdictional limitations of the Tribunal in handling complaints against the Information Commissioner. It also highlights the legal principles that guide the Tribunal’s interpretation of “appropriate steps” and its role in addressing procedural issues, not the merits of the Commissioner’s response. Lastly, it points to the alternative remedy for complainants through separate civil proceedings to seek an order of compliance if they believe their information rights have been infringed.