High Court Addresses Costs Regime in Judicial Review of Criminal Prosecution

Citation: [2023] EWHC 2951 (Admin)
Judgment on

Introduction

The High Court of Justice in the case of AB, R (on the application of) v Uxbridge Youth Court brought forth interesting discussion points centred around the application of costs in judicial review proceedings concerning criminal cases. The case illustrates the nuances within the realm of public interest decisions, prosecutorial discretion, and the financial implications of legal processes. The judgment delineates the circumstances under which the civil costs regime may supersede the general criminal costs regime.

Key Facts

The case involved the judicial review of a decision by the Uxbridge Youth Court, which indirectly challenged the Director of Public Prosecutions’ (DPP) decision to prosecute the claimant, a minor and a recognized victim of trafficking. The DPP agreed to reconsider the prosecution decision and the claimant agreed to withdraw his claim but sought an order for costs incurred during the legal proceedings. The High Court was tasked with determining whether the costs should be decided under the criminal or the civil costs regime and whether the DPP should bear those costs.

Several legal principles emerged as critical to the case:

  1. The Civil vs. Criminal Costs Regime:

    • The distinction between civil and criminal costs regimes and their applicability is rooted in the statutory framework, as interpreted by case law such as Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd and subsequent cases. The case affirmed that costs in criminal proceedings are typically governed by the criminal costs regime unless “exceptional” circumstances warrant a departure to civil costs principles.

  2. Exceptional Circumstances:

    • The court clarified that an “exceptional” case is not merely a statistical rarity but is dependent on compelling reasons that significantly diverge from the routine nature of criminal proceedings. The notion of exceptionality was discussed within the context of existing case law such as Murphy and Darroch v Football Association Premier League Ltd.

  3. Section 19(1) Prosecution of Offences Act 1985:

    • The jurisdiction and limitations of Section 19(1) regarding cost orders against parties in criminal proceedings were central to the claimant’s argument. The High Court reinforced the principle that costs can only be awarded if a party has incurred expenses due to another party’s unnecessary or improper act or omission.

  4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Public Interest:

    • The judgment underscored the prosecutor’s role and discretion in determining whether a case should proceed. It was emphasized that prosecutorial decisions enjoy a degree of protection concerning costs, reflecting the prosecutor’s function as a minister of justice acting in the public interest.

  5. Judicial Review in Criminal Matters:

    • The case underscored the principle established in Belhaj v Director of Public Prosecutions that judicial reviews of decisions to prosecute are considered proceedings in a criminal cause or matter, thereby normally attracting the criminal costs regime.

Outcomes

The High Court concluded that the case did not present any exceptional circumstances to warrant the use of the civil costs regime. The court held that the judicial review was concerned with a routine prosecution and was not out of the ordinary run of cases in the criminal courts. As such, the costs for these proceedings were to be addressed under the criminal costs regime. Since it was agreed that the High Court did not have the power under the criminal costs regime to order the DPP to pay costs incurred by the claimant, the High Court permitted the claimant to withdraw his claim but dismissed his application for costs.

Conclusion

The AB, R (on the application of) v Uxbridge Youth Court case reinforced the concept that the criminal costs regime is typically applicable to judicial reviews of prosecutorial decisions in criminal matters. The judgment clarified the use of “exceptional” circumstances as a qualifier for the civil costs regime and found no such exceptionality in this case. It illuminated the understanding that judicial reviews of prosecutorial decisions to pursue criminal charges are inherently part of criminal procedures, and departures from this norm must be justified by compelling and distinctly unusual reasons. This case serves as a pertinent reference for legal professionals navigating the intersection of judicial review, public interest decisions, and the appropriate costs regimes in criminal matters in the UK.