High Court Upholds Secretary of State's Decision in Prisoner Transfer Case: Key Legal Principles Analyzed

Citation: [2023] EWHC 3071 (Admin)
Judgment on


The case of Allan Overton, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice delves into judicial review and decision-making in the context of prisoner categorisation, specifically relating to a prisoner’s transfer to open prison conditions from a closed environment. The High Court, represented by Mr Justice Eyre, judiciously analyses the rationality and procedural fairness of the Secretary of State’s decision-making process within the confines established by the incumbent legislative and policy frameworks. This article aims to dissect the key legal principles employed to adjudicate the claimant’s grounds of challenge and elucidates the court’s application of these principles to the presented facts.

Key Facts

The claimant, incarcerated for multiple sexual offenses, sought judicial review over the Secretary of State’s rejection of the Parole Board’s recommendation for his transfer to an open prison. The board opined no further risk reduction could be achieved in a closed environment and that such a transfer would not undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. However, the Secretary of State maintained that further work was possible within a closed establishment and that the transfer could indeed affect public confidence.

The two grounds presented for judicial review were:

  1. Rationality of the decision not to accept the Parole Board’s recommendation.
  2. The procedural fairness concerning the concern of undermining public confidence in the criminal justice system.

The court examined several legal principles to assess the legitimacy of the decision:

  1. Rationality: A decision is rational if it is one that a reasonable authority could have made. Contrary views between the Parole Board and the Secretary of State can be rational given their respective expertise and statutory duties.

  2. Engagement with Parole Board’s Recommendation: While not bound by the recommendations of the Parole Board, the Secretary of State must demonstrate a genuine engagement with them, providing a rational and justified basis for departure.

  3. Policy and Decision Publication: Authorities are obliged to publish criteria for exercising discretion to prevent arbitrary decision-making, ensuring transparency and allowing affected individuals to make informed representations.

  4. Non-fettering of Discretion: The Secretary of State must avoid an overly prescriptive approach that would pre-determine the exercise of discretion, essentially leading to an unlawful fettering of said discretion.

  5. Assessment of Public Confidence: The decision-maker must assess the impact on public confidence with a certain level of judgment and discretion, which does not require further detailed criteria beyond what is articulated in the applicable policy framework.


Addressing ground one, the Court found the Secretary of State’s decision both to engage sufficiently with the Parole Board’s recommendation and to be rational. The Secretary of State’s view that the claimant could undertake further risk reduction in closed conditions was considered reasonable due to the claimant’s denial of guilt — a factor which prohibits further treatment but one which the claimant had the impetus to change.

In terms of ground two, the Court concluded that the absence of further articulated criteria for assessing the impact on public confidence did not render the decision arbitrary. The criteria outlined in the Generic Parole Process Policy Framework were deemed adequate for the Secretary of State to exercise judgment and discretion.


The High Court’s decision in Allan Overton underscores the balancing act between judicial deference to specialized administrative decisions and the imperative to prevent arbitrary and opaque decision-making. By upholding the Secretary of State’s decision, the court reinforces the principle that rational judgments can be reached through different evaluative paths, provided the decision-making process embodies genuine engagement with evidence and policy. Moreover, it reminds us that the level of detail required in published policies governing discretionary powers is one of substance over form, being sufficient to notify affected individuals and enable legal scrutiny without necessitating exhaustive criteria.

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