High Court Rules Legislation Violates Human Rights in Jesse Quaye Case

Citation: [2024] EWHC 211 (Admin)
Judgment on

Introduction

The High Court of Justice handed down a significant decision in the case of Jesse Quaye, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice, which scrutinized the compatibility of certain legislative provisions with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The court’s analysis centered around whether sections 27A(1) and 27A(11) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, as amended by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, were aligned with Articles 5 (right to liberty and security) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR. The judgment is intricate, reflecting the complexity of balancing offenders’ rights, the principle of legal certainty, and the interests of victims’ families.

Key Facts

At the heart of the case was the claimant, Jesse Quaye, who at age 17, was involved in a murder and subsequently received a sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure (DHMP), with a minimum term of 15 years. A legislative change in 2022 restricted the statutory right to apply for a review of the minimum term to those who were under the age of 18 when sentenced. The claimant, who was over 18 at the time his review would have been filed, was therefore ineligible under the new law to seek a reduction in his minimum term. He challenged this provision as incompatible with his rights under the ECHR.

The High Court dissected several major legal principles:

  1. Equality and Non-discrimination Under ECHR Article 14: The case turned on whether the claimant was subject to discrimination under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 5, given that he was treated differently from offenders who committed murder before turning 18 but were sentenced while still under 18.

  2. Right to Liberty and Security (ECHR Article 5): Central to the case was the concept of arbitrary detention and whether changes instituted by the new legislation created a risk of arbitrary detention by removing the possibility of a review of the minimum term.

  3. Retrospectivity (ECHR Article 7): The claimant also contended that the removal of the right to review his minimum term constituted a ‘heavier penalty’ than that which was applicable at the time his offense was committed, contravening Article 7 of the ECHR which prohibits retroactive application of harsher penalties.

  4. Fair Trial (ECHR Article 6): The claimant argued that the decision-making process in sentencing, inclusive of the review mechanism, fell under the protection of a right to a fair trial as per Article 6.

The court’s analysis drew upon established case law, including Venables and Thompson which discriminates DHMP sentences requiring the Secretary of State to consider continuing detention and R (Smith) v Home Secretary where it was held that a policy unaligned with a duty of continuing review was unlawful.

The court paid attention to the implications of court delays and system inefficiencies, potentially rendering the application of the new law in section 27A as arbitrary depending on the timing of the sentence - a situation at odds with principles of fairness and legal certainty.

Outcomes

The court concluded that sections 27A(1) and 27A(11) were incompatible with articles 5 and 14. It was determined that:

  • There was no objective justification for different treatment of offenders who were 18 at the time of sentence.
  • The legislation did not change the inherent nature of a sentence of DHMP which involves a right of review and, therefore, created a risk of arbitrary detention.
  • The court did not find ECHR Article 6 applicable as the review of the minimum term was not part of the sentencing process itself.
  • The court did not conclude on ECHR Article 7 as it deemed the argument effectively academic given its findings under Article 5.

Conclusion

The High Court of Justice, in Jesse Quaye, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice, effectively held that the new legislative provisions created a post-sentence distinction without clear justification, thereby infringing upon fundamental rights under the ECHR. This decision underscores the importance of aligning sentencing procedures with overarching human rights principles and maintaining consistency in the legal treatment of offenders undergoing maturational development.