High Court Rules Secretary of State's Decision to Reject Afghan National's ARAP Scheme Application as Legally Flawed

Citation: [2024] EWHC 332 (Admin)
Judgment on

Introduction

In the recent judicial review case of MA, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs & Anor [2024] EWHC 332 (Admin), MR JUSTICE SWIFT was tasked with determining the legality of the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse an Afghan national’s application for assistance under the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP scheme). This decision was made on the grounds that the applicant did not meet certain eligibility criteria outlined in the ARAP scheme, specifically conditions 1c and 2b of the Immigration Rules at Part 7, Paragraph 276BA1 – 276BS5.

Key Facts

The claimant, a distinguished Afghan jurist and legal scholar, was denied assistance due to a purported failure to satisfy the conditions outlining direct employment, contribution to national security objectives, or sufficiently close association with Her Majesty’s Government (HMG). The primary points of contention concerned the claimant’s involvement in drafting the new Afghan constitution and penal code, his role as chairman of the Criminal Law Reform Working Group, and his work as legal advisor to the Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC).

Two letters from the Secretary of State set out the challenged decisions, which the claimant asserted misapplied the relevant provisions of the ARAP scheme and ignored pertinent evidence, rendering the decisions legally flawed.

The court’s analysis hinged on established public law principles, emphasizing that the exercises of judgment required by the ARAP conditions fall within the purview of the administrative decision-maker, provided these decisions are taken lawfully.

Justice Swift applied core public law principles to this case, such as:

  • Proper understanding and application of policy: The decision-maker must correctly comprehend and apply the relevant policy conditions to the facts in hand.
  • Evidentiary evaluation: The decision-maker must consider relevant evidence while disregarding the irrelevant in reaching a conclusion.
  • Irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness): A decision will be quashed if it is unreasonable to a degree that no sensible person acting reasonably could have made it.
  • Holistic approach to conditions requiring evaluative judgment: Particularly for condition 1c, all circumstances in which work was carried out should be considered, not just whether support was provided directly by a UK government department.

Specific legal principles from other cases were referenced, including R(LND1) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1795 (Admin), where Justice Swift elucidated the proper approach to condition 1c of the ARAP scheme, and R(S and AZ) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 1402 (Admin), which addressed similar policy considerations.

Outcomes

The High Court ruled that the Secretary of State’s decisions to reject the application based on conditions 1c and 2b were legally flawed. The Secretary of State either misapplied the conditions or the conclusions drawn were unreasonable when the provided evidence was considered. As a result, the Court quashed the Secretary of State’s decisions and substituted its own conclusion that these conditions were met by the claimant.

Justice Swift directed that the case be remitted to the Secretary of State to reconsider the application concerning conditions 3 or 4 of the ARAP scheme.

Conclusion

The High Court in MA, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs & Anor held that the Secretary of State misapplied the ARAP scheme’s conditions and disregarded the substantive evidence that supported the claimant’s eligibility. The court clarified the legal principles governing the administrative decision-making process, particularly where policy criteria are applied holistically and evaluatively. The judgment reinforces the requirement for decision-makers to apply policies accurately and consider all relevant evidence. The decision further emphasizes that the courts have the authority to substitute their own judgments where administrative decisions are found to be unlawful.