Judicial Review of Parole Board Decisions: McKoy v Secretary of State for Justice Addresses Expertise vs. Discretion

Introduction

The case of Zarak McKoy, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice provides a rich example of the application of judicial review to parole board decisions, and the level of reasoning required when a decision-making authority chooses to depart from the recommendations of a body with particular expertise. The case deals with the tension between the expertise and recommendations of the Parole Board and the decision-making discretion of the Secretary of State for Justice.

Key Facts

In essence, the case revolves around the judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to reject a recommendation by the Parole Board to transfer Zarak McKoy, a prisoner serving a discretionary life sentence, to open prison conditions. This recommendation was made following McKoy’s notable progress in custody and the completion of rehabilitation programmes, despite a past characterized by violence and disciplinary issues. The legal challenge brought before the High Court centered around two key grounds. Firstly, whether the Secretary of State’s decision to depart from the Parole Board’s recommendation was irrational or unreasonable. Secondly, whether the decision was made in absence of published criteria defining what constitutes “a wholly persuasive case” for transfer to open conditions, thus breaching principles of procedural fairness.

Legal Principals

The judicial review delved into several legal principles. Central was the distinction between matters of fact and expert evidence, which the Parole Board is in a superior position to assess, versus judgments requiring the balancing of private and public interests, which fall within the constitutional responsibility of the Secretary of State.

Chamberlain J’s Classification in Oakley

Key to assessing the first ground of challenge was the classification established by Chamberlain J in R (Oakley) v Secretary of State for Justice, differentiating between the Panel’s advantage in assessing facts and expert evidence, and the Secretary of State’s role in evaluating the balance between prisoner interests and public safety.

Reasoning Required of the Defendant

The case law cited, including R (Hindawi) v Secretary of State for Justice, highlighted the requisite level of reasoning expected from the Secretary of State in cases of departure from the Parole Board’s findings. Here, “very good reason” was emphasized for deviation from findings where the Parole Board has seen witnesses, especially on issues of credibility.

Published Policy and Transparency

In addressing the second ground, the case drew on principles from R (Lumba) v SSHD, which sets out the expectation for a transparent statement of how broad statutory criteria are exercised, ensuring that affected individuals can make informed representations.

Outcomes

The High Court, in its analysis, emphasized the significance of the Defendant’s agreement with the Parole Board’s assessments of risk, diverging only in the assessment of whether such a risk could be managed in open conditions. The court found the Defendant’s reasoning regarding the Claimant’s recent behavior and risk profile to constitute sufficient rationalization for departing from the Parole Board’s recommendation.

Furthermore, regarding the procedural fairness challenge, the policy’s use of the term “wholly persuasive case” was deemed lawful. The policy was published, and its terms were clear and understood within the legal framework, satisfying the transparency requirement for policy-making.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the High Court found that the Secretary of State acted within his discretionary powers and rationale in departing from the Parole Board’s recommendation. The case demonstrates the judiciary’s deference to the executive’s constitutional responsibilities, particularly regarding public safety, while reaffirming that discretion must be exercised with due consideration and transparency. The ruling clarifies the balance between the expertise of advisory bodies like the Parole Board and the decision-making prerogatives of authorities such as the Secretary of State, particularly in matters deeply entwined with public safety and prisoner rehabilitation.