High Court Rules on Abuse of Process in Maia Luxury Limited v Luxierge Limited & Anor [2024] EWHC 454 (KB)

Citation: [2024] EWHC 454 (KB)
Judgment on


The case of Maia Luxury Limited v Luxierge Limited & Anor [2024] EWHC 454 (KB) provides a pertinent exploration of the principles concerning abuse of process in civil litigation within the UK legal framework. The judgment, rendered by Deputy Master Skinner KC, addresses an application to strike out a claim on the basis of repeated litigation over a similar, if not identical, subject matter to a previously discontinued claim.

Key Facts

Maia Luxury Limited (the Claimant) initiated proceedings against Luxierge Limited and Mr Thanky (the Defendants) for various breaches including those under a supplier agreement and the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The initial claim was issued and subsequently a default judgment was entered upon the Claimant’s alleged non-response. However, due to an error in the service of documents, the judgment was later set aside, with the initial claim being discontinued. The Claimant then commenced identical proceedings, leading to the Defendants seeking to strike out the new claim, alleging that it constituted an abuse of process.

The judgment hinged on the application of several key legal principles. Firstly, the doctrine derived from the case of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, commonly known as the ‘rule in Henderson’, lay at the core of the discussion. This rule operates to prevent a party from raising in subsequent proceedings issues which could and should have been brought forward in earlier litigation.

The principles laid out in Johnson v Gore Wood [2002] 2 AC 1 were instrumental, setting forth that an abuse of process must be evaluated broadly based on merits, weighing public and private interests as well as the entirety of circumstances. The ‘Henderson abuse’ specifically necessitates a party to fulfill its onus, proving that the subsequent claim is unjust harassment and therefore abusive.

Further consideration was given to Aktas v Adepta [2011] QB 894, which established that negligent failure to timely serve a claim form was not an abuse of process unless accompanied by significant added failings.

In Spicer v Tuli [2012] 1 WLR 3088, the court pointed out the difference between ‘discontinuing’ and ‘dismissing’ an action, the former not precluding the potential for future proceedings on the same matter, especially where it has been expressly or implicitly contemplated as part of a compromise.

Lastly, the case of King v Kings Solutions Group [2020] EWHC 2861 (Ch) reaffirmed that an abuse of process analysis should involve both claims that have concluded via judgment and those that have been discontinued.


Deputy Master Skinner KC rejected the Defendants’ application to strike out the claim. She concluded that the Defendants had not satisfactorily established that the new proceeding was abusive, referencing the lack of prohibition on issuing new proceedings where no defence had been served in the first instance, and the absence of terms precluding future litigation in the settlement of the first claim.

The Court’s preliminary view was that the Defendants should bear the costs of the Claimant concerning the application, subject to assessment if not agreed upon.


The High Court judgment in Maia Luxury Limited v Luxierge Limited & Anor reinforces the nuanced approach required in determining abuse of process. The ruling underscored the need to place the focus not merely on technical compliance with litigation procedure but also on the substantive justice and the intention of the parties, particularly where previous proceedings have been compromised. The ‘rule in Henderson’, as interpreted by subsequent case law, continues to act as a keystone in safeguarding the balance between efficient administration of justice and the rightful opportunities for a party to litigate its claim.

Related Summaries