Court Clarifies Knowledge Requirement for Contempt Liability in M25 Protest Case

Citation: [2023] EWHC 3000 (KB)
Judgment on

Introduction

In the High Court case, National Highways Limited v Charlotte Kirin & Ors, Mr Justice Soole addressed applications for contempt of court concerning breaches of a precautionary injunction. The defendants, associated with the Just Stop Oil protest group, were alleged to have trespassed on M25 gantries. The case explored the legal principles around the knowledge required for contempt liability, service and alternatives to personal service, the burden of proof in contempt proceedings, and the appropriate sanctions for such contempt.

Key Facts

National Highways Limited (NHL) sought an interim injunction to prevent Persons Unknown from trespassing on the M25 motorway structures. The injunction was served using alternative methods, with 12 defendants facing contempt charges. The legal discussions centered on whether the defendants had actual knowledge of the injunction before acting and the relevance of this knowledge to establishing liability and determining sanctions. The protestors argued they were unaware of the injunction when they engaged in their demonstrations, thus contesting the contempt allegations.

Knowledge and Notice of Injunction

A pivotal legal issue was whether knowledge of an injunction is a necessary ingredient for contempt liability. The court considered whether actual knowledge before acting is required or if knowledge is only relevant to the issue of sanction. In line with Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport ([2021] EWCA Civ 357), the court ruled that, provided compliance with approved alternative service methods exists, a respondent is deemed to have notice of the injunction’s terms. Ignorance of the injunction’s terms, while relevant to penalty, is not relevant to liability.

Burden of Proof

The court also addressed the burden of proof in proving knowledge or absence thereof. Justice Soole determined that when service (personal or alternative) is proper, the defendant must prove the absence of knowledge of the injunction to the civil standard. On the issue of sanction, absence of knowledge becomes a mitigating factor.

Contempt Sanctions

The principles for determining sanctions in contempt cases stress the public interest in ensuring court orders are obeyed. Prior case law, including NHL v Heyatawin & ors ([2021] EWHC 3078 (QB)), indicates that sentencing for contempt should factor in culpability, harm, and mitigating circumstances. Imprisonment for contempt is reserved for serious cases of defiance. Furthermore, a suspended sentence can be considered where there is a genuine attempt by the contemnor to engage with the court and affirm they will avoid future breaches.

Outcomes

In this case, the judgment delivered by Mr Justice Soole depends on whether defendants had knowledge of the injunction before or during their actions:

  • Defendants without knowledge before engaging in protest action: Six defendants convincingly argued that they had no knowledge of the injunction before climbing onto the M25 structures. No sanctions were imposed on these defendants due to their lack of awareness prior to breaching the injunction.

  • Defendants who gained knowledge during their protest action: Four defendants acquired knowledge of the injunction after police notified them while they were on the gantries. Despite this knowledge, no sanctions were imposed, given their lack of prior awareness and full compliance with operational removal procedures.

  • Defendants with knowledge prior to protest action: Two defendants were found to have had knowledge of the injunction and were sentenced. One defendant received a four-month custodial sentence, suspended for two years, contingent upon not breaching court injunctions. The other received a two-month custodial sentence, also suspended for two years, on similar terms.

Conclusion

The case underscores the distinction between contempt liability, which does not necessitate actual knowledge of an injunction, and the relevance of knowledge to determining sanctions for contempt. The court’s findings demonstrate a flexible approach to sanctions, choosing to forgo punishment in cases of demonstrated ignorance prior to the act of contempt. Where defiance of court orders is clear and with prior awareness, custodial sentences may be imposed but can be suspended to foster a dialogue with the contemnor. This judgment exemplifies the balance between enforcing legal compliance and recognizing the value of establishing constructive communication with conscientious lawbreakers.