UK Supreme Court Redefines Procedural Fairness in Overseas Divorce Financial Relief Cases

Citation: [2024] UKSC 3
Judgment on


In the case of Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom undertakes a comprehensive analysis of procedural fairness in the context of financial remedy applications following overseas divorce. The key legal principles revolve around the procedural requirements for obtaining court leave to bring a claim under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (the 1984 Act) and the standard by which decisions made without notice to the respondent can be contested and set aside.

Key Facts

The appeal concerns the case of Natalia Potanina and Vladimir Potanin, both Russian citizens who underwent divorce proceedings in Russia. Following the divorce, Mrs. Potanina sought to apply for financial relief in England under Part III of the 1984 Act, given that she had established habitual residence in the UK. The application for leave under Section 13 was initially granted without notice to Mr. Potanin, but later contested and set aside after a rehearing when it was concluded that the court had been materially misled. The Court of Appeal reinstated the original order granting leave, following the established practice that only a ‘knock-out blow’ could justify setting aside leave given without notice.

Several core legal principles emerge from the case:

  1. Procedural Fairness: Fundamental to the rule of law, the case endorses the principle that both parties should be given an opportunity to be heard before a final court order significantly affecting their interests is made. This is encapsulated in the notion that a judge should hear from both sides, not merely from the applicant.

  2. Test for Leave Application under Part III: The case clarifies the threshold standard to be achieved for granting leave to bring a claim for financial relief under Part III. Overturning the ‘knock-out blow’ principle which required demonstrable compelling reasons or proof that the court was materially misled, the Supreme Court asserts that the rules permit a full right to contest the order at a set-aside hearing. This aligns with the judicial understanding that leave should not be granted unless there is a ‘substantial ground’ for the claim, akin to the civil procedural standard of demonstrating a ‘real prospect of success’ to resist summary judgment.

  3. Interpretation of Family Procedure Rules (FPR) and Overriding Objective: The ruling discusses the proper interpretation of the FPR, particularly Rule 18.11, in the context of the Overriding Objective that encompasses fairness and equality between parties. The Supreme Court critiques the manner in which previous interpretations contradicted the clear language of the rules, and thus, the rights of parties in family law proceedings.

  4. Statutory Interpretation: The court’s judgment requires an interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions (Part III of the 1984 Act) against the backdrop of their intended legislative purpose to address financial injustice from overseas divorces while also recognizing jurisdictional nuances.


The main outcomes of the appeal in Potanina v Potanin are the following:

  • The prior established ‘knock-out blow’ test for setting aside court orders made without notice is rejected.
  • The threshold for substantial ground is clarified, aligning more with a ‘real prospect of success’ standard.
  • The Court of Appeal was deemed incorrect in upholding the original decision to grant leave without notice, based on flawed legal reasoning, and thus the case is remitted back to the Court of Appeal for further consideration on alternative grounds raised by the wife.
  • Issues pertaining to the Maintenance Regulation and its influence on jurisdiction were not decided and are remitted for further consideration.


The Supreme Court’s judgment in Potanina v Potanin fundamentally reshapes the procedural landscape of leave applications under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The abandonment of the ‘knock-out blow’ test signals a shift towards ensuring that interlocutory orders are subject to challenge on the same substantive grounds as would initially have been applied at a leave hearing, preserving the principle of procedural fairness. This adjustment offers a stark reminder of the courts’ overarching commitment to equitable legal proceedings, emphasizing the essential role of balanced judicial discretion in family law.

Related Summaries