UK Supreme Court Affirms Mandatory Order Requirement for Local Housing Authorities Under Housing Act 1996

Citation: [2023] UKSC 45
Judgment on


In the matter of R (on the application of Imam) v London Borough of Croydon, the UK Supreme Court was tasked with scrutinizing the legal obligations of a local housing authority under the Housing Act 1996, specifically concerning the mandatory order as a remedy for a breach of statutory duty to provide suitable housing. This critique dissects the Supreme Court’s examination of the issues, including the allocation of scarce housing resources and the appropriateness of judicial intervention.

Key Facts

Ms. Imam, a full-time wheelchair user and mother of three, applied for homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. The London Borough of Croydon acknowledged its statutory duty under section 193(2) of the Act but failed to provide suitable housing for nearly six years. Ms. Imam’s legal action sought a mandatory order compelling Croydon to secure suitable accommodation. At issue was whether Croydon’s resource limitations could justify non-compliance with its statutory duty and affect the court’s discretion in granting a mandatory order.

The Supreme Court’s analysis hinged on several key legal principles:

  1. Statutory Duty and Judicial Review: The Court affirmed that the duty under section 193(2) is immediate, non-deferrable, and unqualified, giving rise to a right enforceable via judicial review.

  2. Discretion in Remedial Orders: The Court underscored that while remedies in public law are discretionary, there is a starting presumption in favor of granting them upon establishing a breach of duty.

  3. Impossibility and Resource Constraints: The Court recognized the principle that a mandatory order should not be issued if compliance is impossible. However, the Court also delineated that resource constraints, while relevant, cannot generally justify non-compliance with statutory duties. An authority must demonstrate taking all reasonable steps to comply, including effectively managing its housing stock.

  4. Balancing Public and Private Interests: The Court contemplated the appropriate balance between enforcing individual rights arising from statutory duties against a public authority and not unduly disrupting the authority’s functions and duties toward the public.

  5. Fairness to Other Claimants: The Court acknowledged the need to ensure fairness among individuals owed a statutory duty, avoiding giving undue precedence through court orders.


The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed Croydon’s appeal while rejecting Ms. Imam’s argument that resource constraints have no bearing on the grant of a mandatory order. It confirmed that the burden rests upon the local authority to substantiate why a mandatory order should not be enacted when in breach of a statutory duty. The Supreme Court set clear parameters for the evidence needed when remanding the case to the High Court for further consideration.


The Supreme Court’s judgment in this case reinforces the sanctity of statutory duties imposed on public authorities and the narrow scope of discretion in declining to grant mandatory orders to enforce such duties. While recognizing the delicate balance of interests, the Court provided a roadmap for assessing whether the grant of a mandatory order is appropriate, emphasizing the primary importance of statutory obligations, and the need for transparency and fairness in managing public resources. The ruling elucidates a nuanced stance, where courts uphold statutory duties, not allowing resource limitations to categorically exempt authorities from legal obligations, but also taking into account pragmatic considerations about resource allocation and fairness to others affected.

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