Upper Tribunal Decision Upholds Mobile Homes Act 1983 Rights in Park Home Dispute

Citation: [2024] UKUT 11 (LC)
Judgment on

Introduction

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) decision in Phillip Robling & Anor v Maurice Fred Doe [2024] UKUT 11 (LC) offers pivotal insights into the procedural and substantive aspects of park home disputes under the Mobile Homes Act 1983. This case review shall distill the key topics discussed in the tribunal’s determination and elucidate the legal principles applied, focusing on their direct relevance to the outcomes of the appeal.

Key Facts

The appellants, Mr. Phillip Robling and Mr. M Sprigg, both residing in mobile homes at Pilgrim’s Retreat, contested the increased pitch fees imposed by the site owner, Mr. Maurice Fred Doe. Initial applications for a pitch fee determination, pursuant to Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983, were struck out by the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). The FTT based its decision on the apparent inapplicability of the Act, as evidenced by an unsigned “Licence Agreement for a Leisure Home,” stating occupancy was for leisure rather than as a primary residence. The Upper Tribunal was thus tasked with reviewing the FTT’s decision to strike out the applications.

The legal crux of the appeal centered on the interpretation and applicability of the Mobile Homes Act 1983, particularly in relation to the requirements for an ‘agreement’ under Section 1(1) of the Act. The tribunal scrutinized two essential elements: the right to station a mobile home with residency entitlement as the only or main residence, and the nature of the site as ‘protected.’ The legal examination extended to considerations of both written agreement terms and the factual conduct between the parties. In a referenced case, Tingdene Marinas, it was established that a resident’s entitlement could extend beyond written agreements, influenced by years of tolerated occupancy which could signal implicit permission from the site owner.

Outcomes

Judge Elizabeth Cooke’s review of the FTT’s decision highlighted several errors of law. Firstly, an assumption was made that the appellants’ living arrangements contravened their formal agreements, despite the possibility of implied consent from the respondent. Secondly, the FTT had erred by not considering whether the appellants’ homes were stationed on a protected site, a determination necessary for jurisdiction under the Mobile Homes Act 1983.

Conclusively, the Upper Tribunal found that the FTT prematurely dismissed the applications without a hearing or sufficient factual findings. The appeal hence succeeded, and the applications to the FTT were restored for further direction.

Conclusion

The Phillip Robling & Anor v Maurice Fred Doe case exemplifies the judicial imperative to consider the totality of a residential arrangement within the context of the Mobile Homes Act 1983, beyond the mere face of written documentation. The decision reaffirms the need for a holistic approach to residential entitlements and the significance of conduct between parties in determining legal rights. It also underscores procedural fairness in striking out applications, emphasizing that assumptions about entitlements should not replace a thorough evidentiary hearing. Legal practitioners should be mindful of these principles when dealing with similar park homes litigation.