Court of Appeal Upholds Decision on Reasonableness of Occupancy in Homelessness Case

Citation: [2023] EWCA Civ 1360
Judgment on


In the case of Joseph Kyle v Coventry City Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1360, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) delved into the complexities concerning the definitions of “reasonable to continue to occupy” within the context of homelessness and intentionality under the Housing Act 1996. The appeal scrutinized the circumstances under which a person could be considered intentionally homeless, concerning the suitability and reasonableness of transient accommodation. This analysis provides a succinct exploration of the key topics and legal principles that were pivotal in this appeal.

Key Facts

Joseph Kyle had been placed in temporary accommodation by Coventry City Council, intended to support recovering drug addicts. After an incident involving theft, the Council deemed him intentionally homeless, a decision which Kyle contested on the basis that the accommodation was not “reasonable for him to continue to occupy.” The specifics of this contention involved comparisons to a women’s refuge discussed in the case of R (Aweys) v Birmingham City Council; Moran v Manchester City Council [2009] UKHL 36, “Aweys/Moran”, and questioned the impact of residence rules and the temporary nature of the accommodation on its reasonableness.

The case analysis focused on the interpretation of “reasonable for him to continue to occupy” in the context of homelessness under sections 175(3) and 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996. The principles were elucidated with reference to precedent cases, including Awua and Aweys/Moran, clarifying the distinction between suitability and reasonableness, and detailing the considerations that could influence whether accommodation is reasonable to continue to occupy.

The court noted that for accommodation to be considered reasonable, the person need not have the right to remain indefinitely or tolerate the accommodation forever. Instead, reasonableness should be assessed concerning the period until re-housing by the local authority is feasible. Factors such as physical characteristics, restrictions affecting life in the accommodation, affordability, and conduct of the person are all relevant in determining reasonableness. However, the physical suitability of accommodation was underlined as being of central importance.

The court also reinforced the principle that review decisions by local authorities should not be nit-picked but instead read in a benevolent light, provided they give clear reasons and take into account relevant matters required by the Act.


The Court of Appeal decided that Coventry City Council’s review officer was justified in determining that Mr. Kyle’s accommodation at 79 St Margaret Road was reasonable for him to continue to occupy. Consequently, Mr. Kyle’s eviction from the property following the theft led to him becoming intentionally homeless within the meaning of section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996. The appeal by Mr. Kyle was ultimately dismissed.


In conclusion, the Joseph Kyle v Coventry City Council case reaffirms the legal principles concerning the assessment of whether it is reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation, particularly in context with the intentionality of homelessness under the Housing Act 1996. The judgment serves as a significant touchstone for future cases where the reasonableness of occupation and the manners in which circumstances and conduct affect such a determination are examined. For practitioners, this case underscores the importance of considering the full constellation of factors when assessing the reasonableness of occupation and reinforces the court’s reluctance to overturn review decisions that have been made in compliance with the statutory framework and have properly considered the applicant’s circumstances.

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