Court Upholds Confiscation Order in R v Josephine Iyamu: Key Issue Surrounding Proceeds of Crime Act Assumptions in Human Trafficking Case

Citation: [2024] EWCA Crim 8
Judgment on

Introduction

In the case of R v Josephine Iyamu, the EWCA Criminal 2024 [2024] EWCA Crim 8, presided over by Lord Justice Popplewell, Mr Justice Saini, and Mrs Justice Foster, the appellant sought an extension of time to appeal against a confiscation order previously made. The case revolves around the application of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) assumptions and how they relate to assumed benefits from general criminal conduct, specifically in the context of proceeds from human trafficking.

Key Facts

Josephine Iyamu was convicted of trafficking five Nigerian women for prostitution, constituting offences under section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and of perverting the course of justice through witness intimidation. Subsequent to her conviction, a confiscation order was made to seize £183,806.06, considered to be the benefit derived from her criminal activities. Iyamu’s counsel, Mr C. Buckley, challenged the inclusion of certain sums in the confiscation amount, particularly credits to a Barclays Bank account and the value attributed to a property in Benin City, Nigeria. Additionally, Iyamu herself submitted an addendum raising other matters.

The legal principles applied in this matter pertain to the assumptions under s.10 of POCA 2002, which come into play due to Iyamu’s criminal lifestyle as established by her convictions. Under s.10(2) and s.10(3) of POCA, property transferred to the offender post-relevant day and property held after the conviction are both treated as acquired through general criminal conduct unless the defendant can disprove the assumptions or demonstrate a risk of serious injustice.

Ground 1

In dispute was the assumed benefit from smaller cash payments and transfers into her bank account. The judge, at first instance, rejected the applicant’s explanations due to lack of supporting evidence and credibility issues. The appellant argued the sum transferred by her husband, who had not been convicted of any crimes, should not be assumed as proceeds of crime. However, the court rejected this argument, emphasizing that proceeds of crime can pass through non-complicit individuals.

Ground 2 and 3

Another issue was the value attributed to a Nigerian property. Here, the court recognized that although the land was purchased before the offending began, the building’s value could be seen as derived from her criminal conduct without concrete evidence to dispute this. The judge’s decision to attribute 75% of the property’s value to the building rather than the land was upheld, with the court recognizing the judge’s discretion to make such an apportionment based on risk of injustice, as allowed by POCA.

Applicant’s Addendum Grounds

The applicant’s additional grounds attacked the methods used to calculate the specific and general criminal benefits, and the reliability of a property valuation. These addendums did not alter the court’s analysis since they provided either belated or unsupported arguments which were not substantiated during the confiscation proceedings.

Outcomes

The court refused the renewed application on the grounds that the appellant failed to provide significant evidence to rebut the assumptions that the monies and property in question were indeed benefits from her criminal conduct. The court highlighted Iyamu’s lack of credible evidence, her inability to provide timely evidence regarding the property, and the appropriateness of the valuation relied upon by the prosecution.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Josephine Iyamu underscores the rigorous standards defendants face when challenging confiscation orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This case illustrates that the assumptions provided under POCA create a significant onus for defendants to provide solid and timely evidence to rebut the presumption that certain properties and monies are proceeds of their criminal conduct. The case marks a clear precedent on the court’s discretion in appraising assets, assuming benefits derived from criminal conduct, and the need for defendants to produce credible dismantling evidence if they wish to oppose a confiscation order effectively.