Court Upholds Secretary of State's Decision in Parole Board Recommendation Dispute

Citation: [2024] EWHC 426 (Admin)
Judgment on


In the case of Cain, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice [2024] EWHC 426 (Admin), the High Court was called upon to examine the Secretary of State for Justice’s decision to reject the Parole Board’s recommendation that Mr. Cain, a life sentence prisoner, be transferred to open conditions. The decision highlights key legal principles surrounding the lawfulness of administrative decisions, the weight given to expert recommendations, and the balance between individual interests and public protection.

Key Facts

Mr. Cain sought judicial review after the Secretary of State for Justice (Defendant) refused to accept the Parole Board’s recommendation for his transfer to open conditions, arguing that this was essential for future decisions on his release and reintegration into the community. The Parole Board had deemed this step crucial based on expert evidence, including psychological assessments. However, the Defendant favored Mr. Cain’s participation in a Progression Regime in closed conditions as an alternative pathway to reduce risks and prepare him for open conditions.

The judgment invokes several legal principles vital to administrative law and parole decision-making:

  1. Rationality Test: A decision must not be irrational, which means that it should not be outside the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. The Defendant was deemed to have had a rational basis for his decision, after considering expert opinions, including the potential benefits of a Progression Regime as opposed to immediate transfer to open conditions.

  2. Weight of Expert Recommendations: The court evaluated how much deference should be given to expert recommendations, noting that the expert’s assessment was crucial for understanding the necessity of transferring Mr. Cain to open conditions. While such recommendations are influential, the Defendant has the discretion to deviate from them, provided credible reasons are presented.

  3. Tameside Duty: This duty requires the decision-maker to adequately inform themselves before making a decision. The Defendant was not found to have breached this duty as he was not required in every case to secure a transcript of Parole Board hearings before making a decision unless there is an indication that such transcripts contain essential information not otherwise available.

  4. Procedural Fairness: It was argued that the Defendant should have given Mr. Cain an opportunity to make representations before making his decision. However, the court found no breach of fairness as the Defendant’s decision was based upon the information already addressed and discussed at the Parole Board hearings.


The High Court found in favor of the Defendant, upholding the decision to place Mr. Cain in a Progression Regime prior to consideration for open conditions. It deemed the decision rational and within the scope of the Defendant’s discretion, emphasizing that the Defendant had access to the necessary information to make an informed decision without obtaining a transcript of the oral evidence from the Parole Board hearing.


The judgment in Cain, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice expertly applies established legal principles to administrative decisions related to the parole process. It demonstrates the latitude afforded to public authorities when deviating from expert recommendations, subject to the caveat that such deviations must be founded on logical reasoning and adequate information. This case serves as a key reference point for the standard of review regarding the rationality of administrative decisions and the weight given to Parole Board recommendations in parole suitability assessments.

Related Summaries