High Court Addresses Case Management Discretion and Expert Witness Issues in Doyle and Rowe Appeals

Citation: [2023] EWHC 2722 (KB)
Judgment on

Introduction

The High Court case of Dermot Joseph Doyle v HDI Global Speciality SE and the conjoined appeal of Mrs Eileen Rowe against a similar order of HH Judge Khan discussed important case management principles related to expert evidence, delay in proceedings, the substitution of expert witnesses, and procedural fairness.

Key Facts

The appeals concerned the installation of cavity wall insulation and the resulting legal disputes over damages attributed to alleged negligence and breach of contract. Both appellants were seeking to appeal decisions that effectively terminated their claims due to issues with their expert witnesses. Mr Doyle’s appeal focused on whether the trial should be vacated, and whether there was an error in not allowing him time to respond to his expert’s email. Mrs Rowe’s appeal was on similar grounds, questioning the dismissal of her claim and failure to allow substitution of her expert witness.

Case Management and Expert Evidence

A core legal principle in these appeals was the courts’ wide discretion in case management, particularly involving expert evidence. As established in the case law, including Global Torch Limited v. Apex Global Management Limited and Azam v University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, an appellate court will seldom interfere with such discretion unless the decision was “plainly wrong” given the “generous ambit where reasonable decision makers may disagree.”

Procedural Fairness and Irregularity

The appeals scrutinized procedural fairness related to correspondence from an expert witness to the court (CPR 35.14), instant decisions made by a judge without explicit prior notice or application by the parties involved (CPR 3.3), and considerations for granting relief from sanctions under the Denton test, which encompasses the seriousness of the breach, the reason for it, and whether relief is just.

Granting Permission for a New Expert

Other relevant legal principles include those relating to ‘expert shopping’ and substitution of expert witnesses. The key question was whether there’s a good reason for substitution and sufficient time to allow for it without prejudicial delay to the proceedings, as inferred from cases Edwards-Tubb v JD Wetherspoon PLC, Adams v Allen & Overy, and Murray v Devenish.

Outcomes

In Doyle, the appeal was dismissed on grounds that there was insufficient basis to vacate the trial due to issues with the expert witness. The judge’s decision not to allow time to respond to the expert’s email leading to the trial not being vacated was within the appropriate exercise of discretion.

In Rowe, the Judge’s dismissal of Mrs Rowe’s claim was upheld. The decision was based primarily on the fact that requisite steps to replace the expert were not taken timely or with full disclosure. Furthermore, the Judge acted within his discretion after considering all relevant factors, outweighing the appellant’s blamelessness.

Conclusion

The cases of Doyle and Rowe offer lucid exemplars of courts’ discretion in case management decisions and the high bar for appellate interference. The judgments affirm the criticality of prompt and transparent actions by solicitors when expert witness issues arise, emphasizing the careful balancing act required between procedural fairness and efficiency in the pursuit of justice. The legal community should heed the importance of court deadlines, candour with the court, and the ramifications of breakdowns in expert relationships, alongside the importance of presenting detailed evidence for seeking adjournments or permission for substitutions of expert witnesses.