Privy Council clarifies legal principles in malicious prosecution case: Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Harridath Maharaj [2024] UKPC 1
Introduction
The Privy Council appeal in the case of Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Harridath Maharaj (Trinidad and Tobago), [2024] UKPC 1, addresses a claim for the tort of malicious prosecution. This case is pivotal in detailing the parameters of the tort and the legal principles associated with determining reasonable and probable cause, as well as malice in pursuing criminal charges. The following analysis will dissect the key elements discussed in the case and clarify the applied legal principles.
Key Facts
Harridath Maharaj, a serving police officer, was charged with felling and removing cedar and teak trees without a permit. Despite his acquittal on a submission of no case to answer, Maharaj brought a claim for malicious prosecution against the Respondent. The trial judge, Seepersad J, found in his favour, awarding damages based on the perceived lack of reasonable and probable cause to initiate the charges. However, the Court of Appeal overturned Seepersad J’s decision, leading to an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Legal Principals
To substantiate a claim for malicious prosecution, a claimant must establish several elements:
- The defendant initiated a criminal charge against the claimant.
- The claimant was acquitted, or the proceedings were determined in their favour.
- The defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause.
- The defendant was actuated by malice.
- The claimant suffered actual damage as a result.
In this case, elements one and two were not disputed, but the crux of the case hinged on the absence of reasonable and probable cause (element three) and the presence of malice (element four).
Reasonable and probable cause has both subjective and objective aspects:
- The subjective aspect necessitates that the prosecutor believed a proper case existed to bring before the court.
- The objective aspect requires that proper grounds for the case existed, judged by evidence known to the prosecutor and any further enquiries deemed necessary.
In assessing malice, the court must determine if the prosecution was initiated for an improper or collateral purpose, which encompasses situations where the defendant is indifferent to the supportability of the charge.
The appeal also invokes the principles for interfering with a trial judge’s findings – namely that an appellate court can intervene not on mere disagreement but on identified errors in principle or reasoning by the lower court, following the guidelines established in Beacon Insurance Co Ltd v Maharaj Bookstore Ltd, [2014] UKPC 21.
Outcomes
The Privy Council identified several significant errors in Seepersad J’s judgment, focusing on the misapplication of the principle of reasonable and probable cause and inappropriate reliance on evidence at trial rather than at the charging stage. As a result, the PC upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision that there was reasonable and probable cause to initiate charges against Maharaj and consequently no malice in those proceedings.
Conclusion
The Privy Council’s adjudication in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Harridath Maharaj reaffirms essential principles governing the tort of malicious prosecution. Crucially, it clarifies that the presence of reasonable and probable cause for initiating charges should be based on the totality of evidence available at the commencement of the prosecution, and not retrospectively from the trial outcomes. This decision guides legal professionals in both the assessment of malicious prosecution claims and the broader conduct of initiating criminal charges.