High Court Examines Judicial Conduct in Hannon v Crown Court: Key Issues on Trial Fairness

Citation: [2024] EWHC 105 (Admin)
Judgment on


The case of Nigel Lloyd Hannon v The Crown Court at Bristol [2024] EWHC 105 (Admin) presents notable considerations regarding judicial conduct during trial proceedings. The judgment is a pivotal reference for understanding the bounds of appropriate judicial interventions and the repercussions such interventions may have on a trial’s fairness. This article will dissect the High Court’s approach in examining the alleged judicial overreach and articulate the legal principles that underpin the ruling.

Key Facts

Nigel Lloyd Hannon was charged with driving without due care and attention and subsequently convicted by Bath Magistrates’ Court. His appeal at Bristol Crown Court resulted in an affirmation of his conviction. The affirmation was primarily based on the judge’s observation about the claimant’s vehicle drifting across the Vibraline strips on the motorway. Judicial review was sought by Hannon, positing that the judge had acted beyond his proper role, specifically through a particular passage of questioning that was deemed akin to cross-examination.

Several legal principles emerge from this judgment, primarily focusing on the appropriate role of a judge during trial and the thresholds that determine whether a trial can be regarded as fair.

  1. Judicial Conduct: A judge should not transform into a de facto prosecutor; their role does not include cross-examining witnesses. As Lord Parker CJ laid out in R v Hamilton, interventions that sway a jury against the defence, make it impossible for counsel to perform their duty, or prevent the defendant from presenting their case justly, can be grounds for quashing a conviction.

  2. Fair Trial: Michel v The Queen (2009) reiterates the overriding principle that a defendant has an absolute right to a fair trial, regardless of prima facie guilt. Interventions leading to an appeal are a matter of degree; not all judicial impropriety will necessitate conviction quashing.

  3. Scope of Judicial Questioning: The line of inquiry by the judge should aim at clarifying ambiguities or understanding evidence, without descending into cross-examination or hostile commentary as per the Privy Council in Michel, which stated judges should not interrupt the flow of evidence needlessly or manifest incredulity at a defendant’s testimony.

  4. Response to Judicial Interventions: The absence of objections at the time of a judge’s interventions can imply that the fairness of the trial had not been compromised, as explicated in R v Binoku.


The High Court concluded that the judge, in his intervention and style of questioning Hannon, did exceed the boundaries of proper conduct. However, this overstep was not sufficient to render the trial unfair. The judicial interventions were deemed not to have shifted the equilibrium of the case, as the central issue pursued by the judge was integral to the charges and not a novel point raised unjustly. This aligns with the case law principle that even improper judicial conduct must reach a certain threshold of impact to negate the fairness of a trial.


In Hannon’s case, while acknowledging the judge’s overreach, the High Court’s decision reflects a nuanced application of legal principles relating to judicial conduct and fair trials. It underscores the tolerance within the legal system for judicial proactivity, provided it does not infringe on the defendant’s right to a genuinely fair trial. This case serves as a cautionary reminder for judges to exercise restraint and maintain impartiality during trial proceedings, and for counsel to raise timely objections should judicial interventions become inappropriate. The case reaffirms that the perception of the defendant’s guilt cannot justify an unfair trial process, reflecting the essence of justice that the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair hearing are inviolable, irrespective of a defendant’s perceived guilt.

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