Upper Tribunal Deliberates Validity of Notices of Intent Under Housing Act 2004

Citation: [2024] UKUT 24 (LC)
Judgment on


In the case of Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council v Hongmei Wang [2024] UKUT 24 (LC), the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) addresses legal issues regarding the validity of notices of intent under section 249A of the Housing Act 2004. Specifically, it tackles the requirements for such notices to be considered valid and explores the consequences of non-compliance with statutory procedures. By analyzing this case, legal professionals can garner insights into the intricacies of housing legislation and the procedural fairness required in civil penalty proceedings.

Key Facts

The crux of the case lies in the adequacy of the notices of intent provided by Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council to Hongmei Wang concerning alleged regulatory breaches in managing a House in Multiple Occupation (HMO). The initial notices were deemed insufficient by the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber), prompting the Council’s appeal.

The Upper Tribunal focused on two primary issues:

  1. The substantiation of information within a notice of intent as per Schedule 13A, Housing Act 2004.
  2. The legal ramifications of a potentially inadequate notice of intent on the validity of the final penalty notice.

The Upper Tribunal’s analysis took into consideration previous case law, including Director of Public Prosecutions v McFarlane, Maharaj v Liverpool City Council, and Waltham Forest LBC v Younis.

Several legal principles emerge from the Upper Tribunal’s deliberations:

Adequacy of a Notice of Intent

A pivotal question was whether the notices in question were sufficiently detailed to satisfy statutory requirements. The Tribunal examined the purpose of the notice of intent, considered the ‘objective contextual scene,’ and clarified that the validity of a notice should be assessed based on a reasonable recipient’s understanding, informed by all relevant knowledge at their disposal.

Compliance with Statutory Procedures

In the context of procedural compliance, the Upper Tribunal reaffirmed the modern approach, set in R v Home Sec., Ex p Jeyeanthan, that the classification of procedural requirements as either “mandatory” or “directory” is obsolete. Instead, the intention of Parliament and the consequences of non-compliance should guide the interpretation, and not every procedural defect would render subsequent proceedings invalid.

Effect of Providing Insufficient Reasons in a Notice of Intent

The Tribunal iterated that an insufficient notice of intent does not automatically invalidate proceedings. It referenced Nash v Birmingham Crown Court to argue that even in regulatory offences, procedural defects in notices do not necessarily render proceedings a nullity if the required information is provided in a timely manner for the recipient to respond effectively.


The Upper Tribunal concluded the following:

  1. Notices of Intent served by Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council were deemed valid. The contents of a notice must enable recipients to respond meaningfully. In this case, previous communications, including a schedule of works and photographs, rendered the slightly vague notices sufficiently clear.

  2. A notice of intent is not automatically void due to lack of precise detail. The essential criterion is whether adequate information was available for the recipient to answer the charge.

  3. The appeal by Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council was allowed, and the case was remitted to a differently constituted panel of the FTT to determine the original appeal concerning the penalties.


The decision in Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council v Hongmei Wang emphasizes the importance of context and the totality of information in assessing the validity of notices under section 249A of the Housing Act 2004. It underscores a departure from strict procedural perfection toward a more pragmatic approach that considers potential harm or prejudice to respondents in enforcement actions. This case reinforces that procedural requirements, while important, should not unduly obstruct the administration of justice, particularly where no prejudice is suffered, and the purpose of the legislative scheme is ultimately served.

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